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CURRENT ISSUES
THE DRUG WAR IN THE
WORKPLACE: EMPLOYEE DRUG
TESTING UNDER COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
The national "war on drugs" has steadily intensified as the issue
of drug abuse has moved to the forefront of the political agenda.'
See Text of President's Speech on National Drug Control Strategy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6,
1989, at B6, col. 1. In a televised speech on September 5, 1989, President Bush outlined
his $7.9 billion plan to combat the national drug crisis, in which he stated that "the gravest
domestic threat facing our nation today is drugs." Id. The President's plan was the most
comprehensive drug control strategy ever sent to Congress. Id. The President noted that
there had been a 38% decline in overall drug use since 1985, when an estimated 23 million
Americans were using drugs on a current basis. Id. That figure, however, obscured the
more ominous figures detailing a sharp increase in cocaine usage. Id. Roughly eight million
Americans used cocaine in 1988, almost one million of whom used the drug "frequently,
once a week or more." Id. The President stressed four major elements of his drug strategy:
(1) increased federal assistance to state and local law enforcement; (2) increased federal
assistance to foreign nations battling drug cartels; (3) federal funding of drug treatment
and rehabilitation facilities increased by $322 million; and (4) federal funding of school and
community drug education and prevention programs increased by $250 million. Id.
President Bush was not the first President to declare war on drugs. See "Growing Menace"
of Drugs - Nixon's Plan to Fight It, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 28, 1969, at 60. President
Nixon, in a 1969 message to Congress, declared that:
Within the last decade, the abuse of drugs has grown from essentially a local po-
lice problem into a serious national threat to the personal health and safety of mil-
lions of Americans.
A national awareness of the gravity of the situation is needed; a new urgency and
concerted national policy are needed at the federal level to begin to cope with this
growing menace to the general welfare of the United States.
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The deleterious effects of the drug epidemic permeate many as-
pects of American society.2 One measure implemented to combat
the drug problem which has commanded much attention and
caused great controversy is mandatory drug testing in the work-
place.' Employers in both the public and private sectors have insti-
tuted drug testing programs to uncover and deter employee drug
use.4 The reason for the proliferation of these programs is clear
Id. See also President Calls for Comprehensive Drug Control Program, 65 DEP'T ST. BULL. 58, 58
(July 12, 1971) (President Nixon announced $371 million multifaceted drug strategy);
Broader Attack on Drug Abuse, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 23, 1970, at 38 (President
Nixon announced a series of programs to combat drug abuse in schools).
The war on drugs continued under President Ford who acknowledged the failure of past
actions to curb drug abuse; accordingly, he urged a shift in the national policy on control-
ling drug abuse. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1975, at Al, col. 4. President Ford released a
"White Paper" which specified that federal drug control efforts be concentrated on those
substances which pose the greatest risk to the public and the user; alternatively, "less de-
structive" drugs, such as marijuana, would be controlled with lower priority enforcement.
Id.
In 1986, a flurry of political activity erupted as the Democratic and Republican parties
sought to "seize" the drug issue. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1986, at Al, col. 6. The Reagan
Administration was told by Republican congressmen to act quickly in proposing legislation
to combat the use of drugs or they would feel forced to endorse a comprehensive 2-3
billion dollar antidrug bill proposed by House Democrats. Id. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 2,
1986, at Al, col. 3 (House Democrats prepared antidrug legislation).
' See, e.g., Fotos, NTSB Asserts Captain's Cocaine Use Contributed to Crash of Continental
Express Metro 3, AvIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Feb. 6, 1989, at 59 (National Transporta-
tion Safety Board cited cocaine use as contributing to commercial aviation accident); Mor-
ganthau, Losing the War?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 14, 1988, at 16 (drug related street crime
surged in urban areas); Sheets, From Hot Tips to Hard Drugs-Another Wall Street Bust, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 27, 1987, at 55 (16 stock brokerage employees arrested for
selling cocaine and trading drugs for stock "tips" and lists of preferred customers); Beck,
Nurses With Bad Habits, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 1983, at 54 (drug abuse among nurses 30 to
50 percent higher than general population, and manifests itself, in some instances, in diver-
sion of medication from patient to personal use).
' See Finding a Middle Between Fairness and Efficiency, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1986, at A6,
col. 1. The author noted that whatever the incidence of drug use in the American work-
place, the incidence of drug testing by employers is rising rapidly. Id. In a poll released in
September of 1986, 44 percent of those polled supported drug testing while 44 percent
opposed such testing. Id. The proponents of drug testing stated that such tests were a
reasonable requirement and would effectively deter drug use, while opponents contended
that the tests were unreasonably invasive and unreliable. Id. See also Tolchin, Government
Still Waits to Test Millions for Drugs, N.Y. Times, March 26, 1989, § 4, at 5, col. 1 (forty
pending federal lawsuits seeking to block random drug testing of over 400,000 federal
employees on constitutional grounds).
' See Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986). The President's order de-
clared that the "Federal government, as the largest employer in the Nation, can and
should show the way toward achieving drug-free workplaces through a program . . . [of
rehabilitation, while demonstrating] . . . that drug use will not be tolerated in the Federal
workplace." Id. The Order called upon all executive agency heads to establish a drug test-
ing program for agency employees in "sensitive positions." Id. The program was to take
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when viewed in light of the dramatic decline in American produc-
tivity, and the concomitant increase in drug related incidents on
the job.'
The validity of drug testing programs has been challenged on
various legal grounds by employees in both the public and private
sectors.6 Recently, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
into account the nature of the agency's mission, the employee's duties and the potential
consequences of employee drug use to public health and safety and the national interest.
Id. See also Feature Report, President Issues Executive Order on Drug Testing of Federal Workers,
24 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1267, 1268 (1986) (one avowed purpose of Presidential
Order was to establish federal programs as model for private sector); White House Fact
Sheets on President's Commitment to National Crusade Against Drugs, and Executive Order on
Drug-Free Federal Workplace, 24 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1298, 1299 (1986) (Presiden-
tial Order to establish anti-drug policy and achieve drug-free workplace).
As President Reagan had hoped, many private sector companies instituted employee
drug testing programs similar to those mandated by the Executive Order. See Kupfer, Is
Drug Testing Good or Bad?, FORTUNE, Dec. 19, 1988, at 133. During 1988, American labora-
tories processed between 15 and 20 million drug tests and approximately half of those tests
were for private sector companies of which 85% were for preemployment screening. Id.
Businesses paid about $200 million in 1988 for drug testing, a figure experts believe will
reach an estimated $500 million by 1991. Id. See also Cox, Workers Win One on Drug Tests,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 29, 1988, at 3, col. 1 (almost 50% of Fortune 500 companies conduct drug
tests).
s See McBee & Peterson, Special Report-How Drugs Sap the Nation's Strength, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., May 16, 1983, at 55. While measurements describing the effect of drug use
on the nation's output are somewhat imprecise, the fact remains that growth in United
States productivity lags behind that of "other major industrial nations, none of which has a
drug problem as serious" as that of the United States. Id. See also Brecher, Taking Drugs on
the Job, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 1983, at 55 (cost of widespread drug use in workforce esti-
mated at $26 billion manifested in lost production, medical expenses for treatment, and
crime prosecution and prevention); New Special Report from BNA Focuses on Drug Testing for
Alcohol and Drug Use, 24 Gov't Emp. Rel. Rep. (BNA), 460, 460 (1986) (government esti-
mated drug abuse costs economy nearly $100 billion per year in lost productivity). See gen-
erally Effect of Alcohol and Drug Abuse on Productivity: Joint Hearing Before Senate Subcomm. on
Alcohol and Drug Abuse and the Senate Subcomm. on Employment and Productivity, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 15 (1982) (testimony of William Mayer, M.D., Adm'r, U.S. Pub. Health Serv.)
(impact of alcohol and drug abuse on workplace productivity).
The profile of a typical recreational drug user in today's work force shows an individual
born between 1948 and 1965. Brecher, supra at 57. This individual is "late three times
more often than fellow employees, requests early dismissal or time off during work 2.2
times more often, has 2.5 times as many absences of eight days or more, uses three times
the normal level of sick benefits, is five times more likely to file a workman's compensation
claim and is involved in accidents 3.6 times more often than other employees." Id. See also
Test for Drugs? Yes and No, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1986, at A24, col. I (editorial) (drug use
costs companies "tens of billions" in health insurance expenses yearly).
' See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1389
(1989) (government employees challenged drug testing program based on fourth amend-
ment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures); Association of W. Pulp and
Paper Workers v. Boise Cascade Corp., 644 F. Supp. 183, 185 (D. Or. 1986) (union chal-
lenged drug testing program as violation of state worker's compensation and breathalyzer
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decided two cases involving mandatory drug testing in the private
sector which have more clearly defined the rights of employees
and prospective employees under collective bargaining
agreements.'
This Note will examine the safeguards available to employees in
unionized workplaces against what are seen as unreasonable intru-
sions into their privacy. First, it will address the safeguards pro-
vided by federal labor law and collective bargaining agreements
between employers and employees. The primary focus of this dis-
cussion will be upon employers' unilateral implementation of em-
ployee drug testing programs under management rights provi-
sions in collective bargaining agreements.8 Next, it will suggest a
standard of uniformity in relation to unilateral implementation of
drug testing programs under management rights provisions. Fi-
statutes); Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1360
(D.S.C. 1985) (private employees challenge urinalysis testing on invasion of privacy
grounds). But see Public Found Ready to Sacrifice in Drug Fight, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1986, at
AI, col. 1 (poll indicated three-fourths of full time workers said they were willing to take
drug test). See generally Note, A Proposal for Mandatory Drug Testing of Federal Civilian Em-
ployees, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 322 (1987) (comprehensive study on constitutional aspects of drug
testing of government employees); Note, Employee Drug Testing-Issues Facing Private Sector
Employers, 65 N.C.L. REV. 832 (1987) (discusses challenges to drug testing programs in
union and non-union settings).
See Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 131 L.R.R.M. 1404 (June 15, 1989) (imple-
mentation of drug testing program screening applicants for employment in union setting
not mandatory subject of bargaining under collective bargaining agreement); Johnson-
Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. 1393 (June 15, 1989) (implementation
of drug testing program screening current employees in union setting found mandatory
subject of bargaining under collective bargaining agreement).
Collective bargaining as contemplated by the National Labor Relations Act has been de-
fined as:
a procedure looking toward making of collective agreements between an employer
and accredited representative of employees concerning wages, hours, and other con-
ditions of employment, and requires that parties deal with each other with open and
fair minds and sincerely endeavor to overcome obstacles existing between them to
the end that employment relations may be stabilized and obstruction to the free flow
of commerce prevented.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 238-39 (5th ed. 1979).
1 See generally M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS (1986). Management rights
provisions entail those rights reserved to management and are, in most instances, found in
the collective bargaining agreement and labeled accordingly. Id. Rights retained by the
union can be found throughout the agreement, classified according to subject matter. Id. at
134. In a Bureau of National Affairs survey of 400 labor agreements, 76% were found to
include provisions regarding management rights. Id. These provisions preserved to man-
agement such items as direction of the working force, management of the business, and
control of production methods. Id.
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nally, it will consider the role of arbitration in determining the
scope of collective bargaining agreements with regard to agree-
ments containing express drug testing provisions, as well as those
silent as to employee drug testing.
BACKGROUND: THE RIGHT To PRIVACY
Although the United States Constitution does not expressly pro-
vide individuals with a right to privacy, it has been established by
the Supreme Court that individuals enjoy a fundamental right to
be free from unreasonable intrusions into their privacy.9 Justice
Brandeis, in his oft-quoted passage, described privacy as "the
right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men."1 An individual's expectation
of privacy is deemed legitimate if society is prepared to accept it
as being reasonable.' However, when determining what consti-
tutes a reasonable expectation of privacy, there is no "bright-line"
standard to be applied; rather, the standard differs according to
I See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). "[T]he Court has recognized that a right
of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under
the Constitution." Id. "[O]nly personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy."
Id. (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). The fourth amendment cre-
ates, at least derivatively, a right to privacy. Id.; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1965) (zones of privacy created by "penumbras formed by emanations" from specific
Bill of Rights guarantees). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) ("[W]herever an
individual may harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy he is entitled to be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion."); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967)
(specific provisions of Constitution protect personal privacy from some forms of govern-
ment intrusions). See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890) (seminal dissertation on origins and scope of right of privacy).
20 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
1 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan submitted that there
is a twofold requirement with respect to an individual's expectation of privacy. Id. "[F]irst,
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Id. See also
Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (Court officially adopted Justice Harlan's "reasonable expectation of
privacy" standard).
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard has become the benchmark for the
Court's fourth amendment analysis. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719
(1987) (hospital employee had reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to items in his
desk and file cabinets); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1984) (school children
have reasonable expectation of privacy in personal property brought onto school grounds);
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (person has reasonable expectation of
privacy in contents of luggage); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968) (union em-
ployee had privacy interest in desk located in office shared with other employees).
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the context in which it is raised. 2 Recently, privacy rights have
been implicated in cases involving the mandatory drug testing of
employees in the public sector, primarily because urinalysis in-
fringes upon an activity which is considered to be among those
that are the most personal and private in society."
I. LABOR UNIONS AND MANDATORY DRUG TESTING
A. Collective Bargaining - Safeguarding Employee Rights
Generally, employers in the private sector enjoy wide latitude in
instituting mandatory drug testing programs." However, private
"' See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 715. The Court declared that there is no "talisman that
determines in all cases those privacy expectations that society is prepared to accept as rea-
sonable." Id.; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 (reasonableness of search depends on context in
which it occurs); Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 ("[Tihe specific content and incidents of this right [to
be free from governmental intrusion] must be shaped by the context in which it is as-
serted."). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) ("[Tlhere can
be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails.").
"' See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1413 (1989). In Skin-
ner, the Court stated that:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of
urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a func-
tion traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance in
public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.
Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir.
1987)). See also Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn., 846 F.2d 1539, 1543 (6th Cir.
1988) ("There are few other times where individuals insist as strongly and universally that
they be let alone to act in private" than when urinating.); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County
School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir. 1988) (society expects urination to be per-
formed in private);. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 487 (1968) (excretory functions
shielded by absolute privacy and to extent this privacy is violated it "detract[s] from one's
dignity and self esteem").
In addition to the privacy concerns inherent in conducting drug testing, "one clearly has
a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in personal information contained in his
body fluids" that may be discovered upon analysis. McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp.
1122, 1127 (D.C. Iowa 1985). See Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights
of Subject Employees: Toward a General Rule of Legality Under the Fourth Amendment, 48 U.
PrrT. L. REV. 201, 206-07 (1986). "[1]f allowed free reign over employees urine specimen,
the employer can learn physiological secrets . . . which go far beyond the existence of
drugs. A urine specimen can . . . reveal whether an employee is pregnant, is using licit
medications, or is being treated for a heart condition, manic-depression, epilepsy, diabetes
or schizophrenia." Id.
" See Monroe v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 661, 663 (E.D. Mo. 1987)
(employee's fourth amendment challenge to employer's drug testing policy rejected due to
lack of state action). Cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974)
(noted dichotomy in fourteenth amendment between discrimination by state, subject to
scrutiny under amendment, and private conduct, however invidious, against which amend-
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sector employers of unionized workers are required to operate
within certain constraints established by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA)16 and the Railway Labor Act (RLA).16
1. National Labor Relations Act
The NLRA mandates that employers bargain in good faith with
unions on issues involving "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.""7 The United States Supreme Court,
in Ford Motor Company v. NLRB,18 espoused a two-prong test to
determine when an issue is a mandatory subject of bargaining,
considering first, whether the matter in dispute is "plainly ger-
mane to the 'working environment,' " and second, whether such
matter is "not among those 'managerial decisions which lie at the
core of entrepreneurial control.' "1
In Johnson-Bateman Company," a concrete pipe manufacturer
unilaterally implemented a work related rule requiring employees
who receive medical treatment for injuries sustained on the job to
ment offers no protection). But cf. Shelley v. Kraemer 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (judicial en-
forcement of private agreements constituted state action); Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir. 1983) (wrongful discharge claim by private sector at-will em-
ployee allowed because discharge violated employee's constitutional rights in violation of
public policy).
- 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-87 (1982) (comprehensive legislation regulating relations between
employers and employees).
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982) (comprehensive legislation regulating relations between
employers and employees in air and rail industries).
' 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). The section provides, in pertinent part, that:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the em-
ployer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and con-
fer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereun-
der, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....
Id.
IS 441 U.S. 488 (1979).
See id. at 498 (quoting Fiberboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1964) (Stew-
art, J., concurring)). The Court, in Ford Motor Co., determined that where an employer
had, on its own initiative provided its employees with an eating facility at their place of
employment, the price at which food was offered was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Id. First, the Court noted that the circumstances under which the food was made available
were clearly relevant to the working environment. Id. Second, the Court observed that the
employer was not in the business of selling food for profit, and the pricing of the available
food was not a managerial decision which involved the operation of the business. Id.
20 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. 1393 (June 15, 1989).
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 5: 1, 1989
submit to drug testing.2 The employees' union filed an unfair la-
bor practice charge claiming that their employer had imple-
mented the drug testing program without providing the union
with prior notice and an opportunity to bargain.22 In determining
whether the work rule involved a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing, the NLRB23 applied the two-prong test promulgated by the
Supreme Court.24 First, the NLRB determined that since contin-
ued employment was potentially contingent upon test results,2
the drug testing program was "plainly germane to the working
environment. '"26 Next, the NLRB found that the implementation
of the drug testing program was not aimed at changing the nature
of the employer's enterprise, therefore, it was "not among those
'managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial
control.' "27 Based upon the two preceding determinations, the
21 Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1395 (June 15,
1989). On December 1, 1986, the Johnson-Bateman Company posted notice that, effective
immediately, all injuries in the workplace which required medical treatment would be ac-
companied by a drug/alcohol test. Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1395. This notice was posted with-
out prior notification to, or bargaining with, the union. Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1395.
22 See Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1395 (June 15,
1989). The union's complaint alleged that the unilateral implementation of a drug testing
program violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) and (1)). Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1395.
2- 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976). The National Labor Relation Board (NLRB) is authorized to
conduct investigations into unfair labor practice charges, hold adjudicatory hearings, issue
cease and desist orders, award affirmative remedies and, in appropriate cases, petition the
federal courts for injunctive relief to effect the goals of the National Labor Relation Act.
Id.
4 Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1396-97 (June 15,
1989).
2" See Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1397 (June 15,
1989). The company had existing rules against the use or possession of alcohol and drugs
on company premises. Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1397. The rules further prohibited reporting
for work while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1397. Viola-
tion of these rules was punishable by disciplinary action, including discharge. Id., 131
L.R.R.M. at 1397.
2 Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1396 (June 15,
1989). The NLRB found drug testing to be most closely analogous to physical examina-
tions and polygraph testing, both of which have been determined to be germane to the
working environment. Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1396.
27 Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1397 (June 15,
1989). The institution of a drug testing program did not involve "the commitment of in-
vestment capital and could not be characterized as a decision taken with a view toward
changing the scope or nature of the enterprise." Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1397. Rather, it was
a more limited decision "directed toward reducing workplace accidents and attendant in-
surance rates." Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1397.
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NLRB concluded that the drug testing program was a mandatory
subject of bargaining. 8 Additionally, the NLRB held that the
broad terms in the contract's "management rights" clause' were
not sufficient to constitute a "clear and unmistakable" waiver of
the employees' right to bargain over the implementation of the
drug testing program. 0
In Star Tribune,"' an employees' union demanded to bargain
over an aspect of their employer's new drug and alcohol policy
which required drug testing of all applicants for employment. 2
The employer rejected the union's demand, and unilaterally im-
plemented the new drug testing policy for prospective employ-
ees.83 The union filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that
the employer's refusal to bargain violated the bargaining provi-
sions of the NLRA. "' The NLRB held that applicants for employ-
ment did not fall within the statutory definition of "employees,'"'"
"8 See Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1397 (June 15,
1989).
" See Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1394 (June
15,1989). The parties' contract contained the following provision:
Section 3: Management's Rights
.I The management of the plant, direction of the working forces, and work affairs
of the Company, including but not limited to the right ... to discipline or discharge
for just cause . . .to issue, enforce and change Company rules [is reserved to the
Company] .... Thus, the Company reserves and retains, soley [sic] and exclusively,
all of the rights, privileges and prerogatives which it would have in the absence of
this Agreement, except to the extent that such rights, privileges and prerogatives
are specifically and clearly abridged by express provision of this Agreement.
Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1394.
" See Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1399 (June 15,
1989). The NLRB found that the management rights clause which permitted the employer
to unilaterally issue and change company rules was expressed in extremely general terms
and made no specific reference to any particular subject matter, much less specific refer-
ence to drug testing. Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1399. Based on this finding, the NLRB held that
the clause did not constitute an express, clear, unequivocal and unmistakable waiver by the
union of its right to bargain over the drug testing program. Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1399.
295 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 131 L.R.R.M. 1404 (June 15, 1989).
Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 131 L.R.R.M. 1404, 1406 (June 15, 1989). On
several occasions the union told the employer that it considered all components of the
company's new drug testing policy, including the aspect regarding testing of prospective
employees, to be mandatory subjects of bargaining and demanded bargaining over the pol-
icy. Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1406.
33 Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1406.
34 Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 131 L.R.R.M. 1404, 1406-07 (June 15, 1989).
The union alleged that the employer had violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National
Labor Relations Act Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1406-07.
" See Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 131 L.R.R.M. 1404, 1408 Uune 15, 1989).
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thus, the employer was under no obligation to bargain over this
subject. 6 In addition, the NLRB rejected the argument that the
testing of prospective employees was a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining because it "vitally affect[ed] the terms and conditions of
employment" of current union employees.37 An indirect or inci-
dental impact upon the bargaining unit was held insufficient to
establish a matter as a mandatory subject of bargaining.3 8 Conse-
quently, a prospective employee is left with little or no protection
against an employer who elects to test for illegal drugs. 9
2. Railway Labor Act
The Railway Labor Act (RLA), like the NLRA, imposes obliga-
tions on the part of railway and airline employers to bargain over
The NLRB utilized a statutory definition of "employee" which provides:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and
shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in con-
nection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent
employment ....
Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1408 n.8. The NLRB stated that the legislative history of the NLRA
indicated that the term "employee" was not to be "stretched beyond its plain meaning
embracing only those who work for another for hire." Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1408. The
NLRB noted that "applicants perform no service for the employer, are paid no wages, and
are under no restrictions as to other employment or activities." Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1408.
Furthermore, the NLRB distinguished the prospective employment situation from other
intermittent employment situations such as those arising from union hiring halls. Id., 131
L.R.R.M. at 1408. Cf. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157, 165-68 (1971) (Court found retirees did not fall within statutory definition of
"employees").
" Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 131 L.R.R.M. 1404, 1410 (june 15, 1989). Hav-
ing found prospective employees were not "employees" as defined by statute, the Board
held that the employer was under no obligation to collectively bargain over the unilaterally
implemented drug testing program with those applicants. Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1410.
37 Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 131 L.R.R.M. 1404, 1409 (June 15, 1989). The
NLRB defined the "vitally affects" standard as "including only those matters that materi-
ally or significantly affect current employees' terms and conditions of employment." Id.,
131 L.R.R.M. at 1409 (quoting United Technologies Corp., 274 N.L.R.B. 1069 (1985)
enforced 789 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1986)). "'[T]erms and conditions of employment' . . . does
not include all subjects that may merely be of interest or concern to the parties." Id., 131
L.R.R.M. at 1409. That applicant testing will to some degree affect current employees does
not, standing alone, vitally affect the terms and conditions of their employment. Id., 131
L.R.R.M. at 1409 (emphasis added).
3 Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 131 L.R.R.M. 1404, 1409 (June 15, 1989).
" See Note, Employee Drug Testing-Issues Facing Private Sector Employees, 65 N.C.L. REV.
832, 836 (1987) (absent employment contract or union contract private sector employers'
freedom to test employees "mostly unfettered").
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"pay, rules, and working conditions."'" An important and unique
aspect of RLA jurisprudence is the differentiation of "major" and
minor" disputes.4' Under the RLA, a "major" dispute occurs
when a party seeks to create contract rights, while a "minor" dis-
pute occurs when a party seeks to enforce existing contract
rights.'2 In the event a dispute between an employer and em-
ployee is classified as a major dispute, the RLA requires the par-
ties to undergo a protracted process of bargaining and media-
tion.'3 Until the completion of this process, the parties are
obligated to maintain the status quo and the employer may not
unilaterally implement the contested change in rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions." In contrast, if an employer/employee
" 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982) (details scope of air and rail carriers' collective bargaining
obligations).
' See Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945). The Court de-
scribed a major dispute as relating to:
disputes over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them. They
arise where there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change the terms of
one, and therefore the issue is not whether an existing agreement controls the con-
troversy. They look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of
rights claimed to have vested in the past.
Id. The Court went on to describe a minor dispute as one which:
contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any
rate, a situation in which no effort is made to bring about a formal change in terms
or to create a new one. The dispute relates either to the meaning or proper applica-
tion of a particular provision with reference to a specific situation ....
Id.
" Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2480
(1989). See International Bhd. of Teamsters , Local 19 v. Southwest Airlines Co., 875 F.2d
1129, 1133 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 838 (1990). The terms major
and minor do not refer to the relative importance of the dispute, rather they refer to the
bargaining context in which the dispute arises. Id. The Southwest court described major
disputes as involving "proposals for new agreements or for changes in existing agree-
ments." Id. The court proceeded to describe minor disputes as involving "grievances over
the application of an existing agreement." Id.
- 45 U.S.C. § 152 Sixth, Eighth, Ninth (1982). The RLA requires that carriers and
unions representing carriers' employees to make a reasonable effort "to settle all disputes
in order to avoid any interruption to commerce." 45 U.S.C. § 152 First (1982). The RLA
specifically delineates the procedures of mediation. Id. at §§ 151-56. The RLA provides
that major disputes must first be mediated; if not resolved, the parties may agree to bind-
ing arbitration, or there is a possibility of presidential intervention. Id. at §§ 157, 159-60.
- 45 U.S.C. §§ 155 First, 156, 160 (1982). See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood
of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 445 (1987). The Court noted that dur-
ing the major dispute resolution procedures, the parties must abide by the existing agree-
ment; only if these steps fail may the parties resort to self help through economic mea-
sures, or in the case of management, unilateral implementation of the disputed program.
Id. See also Southwest Airlines, 875 F.2d at 1133 (parties must abide by existing agreements
during course of mediation or arbitration); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Frontier
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dispute is classified as minor, the RLA requires compulsory and
binding arbitration before the appropriate adjustment board.45
However, the RLA does not prohibit unilateral implementation
by the employer of the contested change in work related rules
pending the results of arbitration when a dispute is classified as
minor. 6
Recently, in Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Association,47 the Supreme Court articulated a standard for
differentiating between major and minor disputes under the RLA.
The Court declared that "where an employer asserts a contractual
right to take a contested action, the ensuing dispute is minor if
the action is 'arguably justified' by the terms of the parties collec-
tive bargaining agreement."48 In contrast, the Court provided
that where an employer's assertion of a contractual right is "frivo-
lous or obviously insubstantial," the dispute is major.49
In Consolidated Rail, the employer, Consolidated Rail Corp.
(Conrail), had required, since its formation in 1976, that its em-
ployees undergo physical examinations both periodically and upon
returning from a leave of absence. 50 In 1987, Conrail unilaterally
Airlines, Inc. 664 F.2d 538, 540-41 (5th Cir. 1981) (preservation of status quo thioughout
major dispute resolution procedures extremely important).
" See Consolidated Rail, 109 S. Ct. at 2480. "A minor dispute in the railroad industry is
subject to compulsory and binding arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment
Board, § 3 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 153), or an adjustment board established by the em-
ployer and the unions representing the employees. § 3 Second (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 153
Second)." Id. at 2480-81. See 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1982). The RLA, as applied to the airline
industry, created no national adjustment board; a minor dispute is resolved by an adjust-
ment board established by the airline and the unions. Id.
Arbitration is the "reference of a dispute to an impartial (third) person chosen by the
parties to the dispute who agree in advance to abide by the arbitrator's award issued after a
hearing at which both parties have had an opportunity to be heard." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 96 (5th ed. 1979). See generally T. OEHMKE, EMPLOYMENT, LABOR & PENSION ARBI-
TRATION (1989) (comprehensive treatise on arbitration and arbitral procedure).
," See Southwest Airlines, 875 F.2d at 1133 (unilateral action based on party's interpreta-
tion of existing provisions in collective bargaining agreement not prohibited under RLA);
Frontier Airlines, 664 F.2d at 541 (same).
17 109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989).
" Id. at 2482 (quoting Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Burlington N.
Ry., 802 F.2d 1016, 1022 (8th Cir. 1986)). The Consolidated Rail Court noted that the
"arguably justified" standard represented a relatively light burden which the employer
must overcome in order to establish a minor dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
adjustment board. Id.
49 Id.
'o Id. at 2485. Conrail conducted physical examinations in three categories of cases. Id.
First, it has always conducted periodic physical examinations which have routinely included
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amended its work rules to include drug testing as part of all peri-
odic and return-from-leave physical examinations. 5 Conrail as-
serted that its existing policy of conducting physical examinations
arguably gave it the discretion to include drug testing in all physi-
cal examinations. 2 The Court held that the addition of a drug
testing component to routine physical examinations was arguably
justified by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and
thus, the dispute was deemed minor." Therefore, Conrail was
able to unilaterally implement the drug testing program pending
compulsory and binding arbitration before the National Railroad
Adjustment Board (NRAB).5 '
B. Management Rights and the Duty to Bargain
A conflict has arisen in cases construing the NLRA and the
RLA as to whether the unilateral implementation of drug testing
programs is arguably provided for in management rights clauses
within collective bargaining agreements.55 The NLRB has held
a urinalysis for blood sugar and albumin. Id. Second, Conrail required train and engine
employees who have been on furlough, leave, suspension, or other similar cause for at least
thirty days to undergo return-to-duty physical examinations. Id. These examinations also
routinely included urinalysis. Id. Third, when justified by the employees condition, Conrail
routinely required follow up physical examinations. Id. Any employee who failed to meet
the prescribed standards of health may be held out of service without pay until the condi-
tion is corrected or eliminated. Id. at 2486.
51 Id. Drug testing has always been included in Conrail's physical examinations if in the
judgment of the examining physician the employee might have been using drugs. Id. In
addition, drug screens have been included in physical examinations of employees who have
been taken out of service due to previous drug related problems. Id.
"1 Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2487
(1989). Conrail argued that "past practice reflected that drug use has been deemed rele-
vant to job fitness, and that Conrail's physicians have the discretion to utilize drug testing
as part of their medical determination of job fitness." Id. Conrail further asserted that the
parties' implied agreement regarding physical examinations justified its unilateral imple-
mentation of the mandatory drug testing program. Id.
" Id. at 2489. The Court emphasized that Conrail had only met the light burden of
showing that its drug testing practice is arguably justified by the terms of its collective
bargaining agreement. Id. The Court further emphasized that it had not decided the case
on the merits, and in no way did it suggest that Conrail was or was not entitled to prevail
before the arbitral board on the merits of the dispute. Id.
" Id. at 2480. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdiction of appro-
priate adjustment boards under RLA).
5 CompareJohnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1399 Uune
15, 1989). (NLRB held that broad management rights clause did not constitute clear and
unmistakable waiver of employees' right to bargain, nor did clause provide employer with
sound arguable basis for claiming contractual right to unilaterally implement its drug test-
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that under the NLRA a broad management rights clause does not
constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of a union's right to
bargaiii over the implementation of drug testing programs." In
addition, the NLRB held that the general provisions of a broad
management rights clause do not provide an employer with a
"sound arguable basis" for claiming a contractual right to imple-
ment drug testing programs.5" Under the NLRB approach a drug
testing program is a mandatory subject of bargaining, and as such,
unilateral implementation predicated upon a management rights
clause constitutes an unfair labor practice under the NLRA.58
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local 19 v. Southwest Airlines Company," held that within
the context of the RLA, a broad management rights clause "ar-
guably justified" an employer's claim that the clause granted them
the power to unilaterally implement a disputed drug testing pro-
gram."O Moreover, the Southwest Airlines court determined that
ing program) with Southwest Airlines, 875 F.2d at 1135. (court held that in context of RLA,
broad management rights clause "arguably justified" unilateral implementation of drug
testing program without first bargaining with union).
5' See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing management rights and waiver of
right to bargain).
" See Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1400 Uune 15,
1989). An employer has a sound arguable basis for ascribing a particular meaning to his
contract when a clause in the contract is subject to more than one plausible interpretation.
Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1400. The NLRB found that invoking general provisions of a man-
agement rights clause to justify unilateral implementation of a drug testing program was an
implausible interpretation of the contract, and therefore no "sound arguable basis" existed
for ascribing to that clause such power. Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 1400 (quoting Southern Cal.
Edison Co., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 142, 126 L.R.R.M. 1324 (July 23, 1987)). Because the em-
ployers position was untenable, the NLRB found that it did not improperly enter the dis-
pute merely to serve the function of the arbitrator who must determine the correct inter-
pretation of the contract. Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M.
1393, 1400 (June 15, 1989).
" See Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1393, 1399
(June 15, 1989). See also supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text (discussing what consti-
tutes mandatory subject of bargaining under NLRA).
875 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 838 (1990).
I ld. at 1135. The Southwest Airlines court stated that the management rights clause in
the collective bargaining agreement between Southwest and the employees' union at least
arguably granted Southwest the right to unilaterally enforce its work policy by "promulgat-
ing rules, regulations and orders such as this drug testing program." Id. (emphasis in origi-
nal). The court proceeded to show that Southwest complied with the four requirements
necessary under the management rights clause. Id. The following facts were considered by
the court in Southwest Airlines: (1) the program consisted of rules, regulations and orders
within the meaning of the clause; (2) the program was issued by the proper authorities of
the company; (3) no term or condition of the collective bargaining agreement conflicts with
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the management rights clause constituted an arguable waiver of
the union's right to bargain.61 However, the final determination
of whether the waiver was "clear and unmistakable" was left to
the judgment of the arbitrator. 62 Since the action of Southwest
Airlines (Southwest) was found to be "arguably justified," it gave
rise to a "minor" dispute under the RLA.6" As such, mandatory
the program; and 4) the program was available to employees before becoming effective. Id.
Having complied fully with all the requirements of the management rights clause, the
court held the unilateral implementation of the program was arguably justified. Id. But see
Transport Workers' Union, Local 234 v. Southeastern Pa. Transit Auth., 863 F.2d 1110,
1124 (3d Cir. 1988) (broad management rights clause cannot justify implementation of
changes in workitg conditions), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 3208, rev'd on other grounds, 884 F.2d
709, 713 (1989) (addition of random drug testing program to existing drug testing program
was issue arguably covered by collective bargaining agreement); United Indus. Workers v.
Board of Trustees, 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1965) (court rejected argument that manage-
ment rights clause constituted waiver of union's right to bargain). See also Local 553,
Transport Workers' Union v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 695 F.2d 668, 673 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982)
(criticized major/minor distinction as unsatisfactory since management rights clause can
arguably be invoked to support any action by management not in direct conflict with con-
tractual right of union).
"1 See Southwest Airlines, 875 F.2d at 1135. "In general, the contractual waiver of a statu-
tory right under federal labor law must be clear and unmistakably expressed." Id. at 1135
(emphasis added). "[Tihis general rule of construction has been applied to questions of the
waiver of a duty to bargain." Id. The Southwest Airlines court noted, however, that this rule
of construction has been applied exclusively to cases governed by the NLRA. Id. The court
discussed the application of the NLRA "clear and unmistakable" waiver construction to
the instant case and the RLA, but decided that it was a debatable matter of law as to
whether the NLRA rule of construction applied to the RLA. Id. at 1135-36. The court
found the question to be inconsequential, since even if it assumed that the management
rights clause permitted Southwest to unilaterally implement the disputed program only if
the clause is a "clear and unmistakable" waiver, Southwest's interpretation of the clause
did "satisfly] the minimal burden of arguably being a clear and unmistakable waiver." Id.
at 1136. The fact that the two constructions of waiver, "arguable" and "clear and unmis-
takable," could not be easily reconciled, was, to the court, some indication that the clear
and unmistakable waiver construction of the NLRA may not apply to the RLA. Id.
"2 See id. at 1135-36. The court declared that the merits of Southwest's interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement were clearly for the arbitrator to decide. Id. See also
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2489 (1989)
(White, J., concurring). If the arbitrator finds that Southwest's claim is without merit and
that the union did not waive its right to bargain, the result would be that Southwest had
sought a change in the collective bargaining agreement without invoking the procedures
applicable to a major dispute. Id.
" See Southwest Airline!, 875 F.2d at 1135. The Southwest Airlines court noted that since
both parties presented arguable constructions of the contract's management rights clause,
the dispute was minor. Id. The court recognized the arguable validity of the union's posi-
tion that the management rights clause "[did] not speak at all to the right to bargain over
rules, only the willingness to abide by rules validly enacted." Id. (quoting International
Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 19 v. Southwest Airlines Co., 842 F.2d 794, 804 (5th Cir. 1988)
(panel opinion), rev'd, 875 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 838
(1990)). Alternatively, Southwest asserted that the management rights clause "binds em-
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bargaining was not required in the first instance, instead, South-
west was permitted to unilaterally implement the disputed pro-
gram pending the decision of an arbitrator as to the relative rights
of the parties under the collective bargaining agreement.6" It is
submitted that whether the management rights clause actually
constituted a waiver by the union of its right to bargain under the
RLA is a question more properly addressed in a federal court."6 It
is further suggested that it is only after the federal court decides
whether the union has waived its right to bargain that the charac-
ter of the dispute should be determined, and the appropriate
channel of dispute resolution proclaimed.6 Finally, it is submitted
that a broad management rights clause, standing alone, should not
constitute a waiver of the union's right to bargain, nor justify, ar-
guably or otherwise, an employer's unilateral implementation of a
drug testing program. This determination would result in the con-
flict being routed to the major dispute resolution process.6 7
Alternatively, if, as in Southwest Airlines, a court holds that a
management rights clause arguably justifies an employer's unilat-
eral implementation of a drug testing program, 68 an employees'
union may seek injunctive relief in a federal district court. How-
ever, when a dispute is deemed to be "minor," under the RLA,
ployees to any and all rules that do not conflict with the agreement and are promulgated
by management with advance notice." Id. The court held that the merits of the two inter-
pretations was for the arbitrator to decide. Id.
" See Consolidated Rail, 109 S. Ct. at 2481 (no statutory obligation to maintain status quo
pending arbitral decision). See also Southwest Airlines, 875 F.2d at 1133 (when dispute is
minor RLA does not prohibit unilateral implementation pending exhaustion of arbitra-
tion); Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Burlington N. R.R., 838 F.2d 1087, 1091 (9th
Cir. 1988) (no duty to maintain status quo when dispute found to be minor).
6 See Southwest Airlines, 875 F.2d at 1149 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). It is for the court to
decide the waiver question first, as a matter of law, and then route the dispute to one of
the two dispute resolution channels. Id. Furthermore, the dissent argued that "clear and
unmistakable" waiver is not a contract construction unique to the NLRA, but a fundamen-
tal and longstanding rule of law which if abandoned would be replaced by arbitrary deter-
minations. Id.
66 Id. The Southwest Airlines dissent argued that it was improper to give one channel of
the RLA dispute resolution process (arbitrator) the authority to decide whether the alter-
native channel (mediation board) is the appropriate forum for resolution. Id. Furthermore,
when the dispute resolution forum is contested, federal courts, unlike adjustment boards,
are "relative strangers to the actual dispute resolution process." Id.
67 See supra notes 43 & 44 and accompanying text (details major dispute resolution
procedures).
66 See International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 19 v. Southwest Airlines Co., 875 F.2d
1129, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 838 (1990).
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courts are disinclined to interfere with the arbitral jurisdiction of
the appropriate adjustment board.69
Generally, in the context of labor disputes, the issuance of in-
junctions is precluded by the jurisdictional limitations imposed
upon federal courts by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 0 However, in
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,1 the Supreme
Court recognized a "narrow" exception to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.7 2 This exception allows courts to enjoin actions by either
party to a dispute which will "frustrate" the arbitral process." In
'9 See, e.g., Southwest Airlines, 875 F.2d at 1136 (injunctive relief issued only where neces-
sary to preservejurisdiction of grievance procedure); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 833 F.2d 700, 708 (7th Cir. 1987) (injunction issued only when neces-
sary to preserve NRAB's jurisdiction). See also Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Mis-
souri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 363 U.S. 528, 532-35 (1960) (discussing preservation of NRAB'sju-
risdiction); Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 567 (1946) (lower court
erred by not giving NRAB an opportunity to arbitrate issue).
'0 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982). The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in pertinent
part that: "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute ....... 29 U.S.C. § 104. The Norris-LaGuardia Act manifests the strong
federal policy determination that arbitration should be encouraged as a device to peace-
fully resolve disputes between management and labor and to discourage courts from en-
croaching upon the functions of the arbitrator. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 242-43 (1970). See also Steelworkers Trilogy (United Steelwork-
ers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of
America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of
America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)) (emphasized congressional
policy to promote peaceful resolution of labor disputes through arbitration).
" 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
Id. at 253. In Boys Markets, the Court sought to "reconcile" the Norris-LaGuardia
policy of protecting the nascent labor movement by mandating nonintervention of federal
courts, with subsequent enactments, adopted without any substantial revision of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, that indicated a shift in congressional policy from protection of the emerg-
ing labor movement to the encouragement of collective bargaining and arbitration to
peacefully resolve industrial disputes. Id. at 251. The Court noted that the statutory man-
date of arbitration imposed by the RLA, manifesting the important federal policy of peace-
ful resolution of labor disputes through arbitration, would be imperiled if equitable relief
were not available to successfully implement the arbitral process. Id. at 251-52 (citing
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago & Ind. Ry. 353 U.S. 30 (1957)). See Buffalo
Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, 428 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1976)
(refined Boys Markets by clarifying that injunctive relief was available only when the under-
lying dispute was arbitrable and such arbitration would be frustrated in the absence of
equitable relief). See generally Cantor, Buffalo Forge and Injunctions Against Employer
Breaches of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 247 (1980) (comprehensive
discussion of injunctive relief pending arbitration and exception to Norris-LaGuardia Act);
Payne, Enjoining Employers Pending Arbitration - From M-K-T to Greyhound and Beyond, 3
INDUs. REL. L.J. 169 (1979) (discussing injunctive relief pending arbitration and exception
to exclusive jurisdiction of adjustment board under RLA).
" See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l v. Amoco Oil, 885 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1989).
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addition to satisfying this prerequisite, a court must also find that
the "ordinary principles of equity" support the issuance of an in-
junctin. 4 Ordinarily, for an injunction to issue, courts require a
showing of some likelihood of success on the merits,75 that irrepa-
rable harm will be suffered in the absence of an injunction,"m and
Noting that Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge both involved employers seeking to enjoin em-
ployee activities allegedly in violation of collective bargaining agreements, the Amoco Oil
court held that the "principles of th[o]se cases [were] equally applicable to analyzing
whether injunctive relief was appropiriate to restrain employers from acting so as to under-
mine the arbitration process." Id. at 702. See also Aluminum Workers Int'l v. Consolidated
Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437, 441 (6th Cir. 1982) (injunction appropriate where em-
ployer action undermines integrity of arbitral process or deprives union of effective arbitral
remedy); Local Lodge No. 1226, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Pano-
ramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 282 (7th Cir. 1981) (same); Lever Bros. Co. v. International
Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 123 (4th Cir. 1976) (same). But see Utility
Workers of America, Local No. 246 v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1083, 1088
(9th Cir. 1988), (district court erred in enjoining employer's unilateral implementation of
drug testing program in absence of employer's express or implied promise to maintain
status quo pending arbitration) cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1530 (1989); Amalgamated Transit
Workers, Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir.), (limited availabil-
ity of Boys Markets injunction to situations in which employer expressly or impliedly prom-
ised to maintain status quo pending arbitration) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977).
"' Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254. The district court must consider whether "breaches are
occurring and will continue, or have been threatened and will be committed; whether they
have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the employer; and whether the employer
will suffer more from the denial of the injunction than the union will from its issuance." Id.
(quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing)). If the equitable requirements are met, in addition to the Boys Markets requirement of
frustration of arbitration, "the proper accommodation of the various conflicting national
labor policies will not be undercut by the issuance of an injunction to maintain the status
quo." Amoco Oil, 885 F.2d at 703. See supra note 73 (noting that Boys Markets principle
applies equally to employer breaches).
" Amoco Oil, 885 F.2d at 703. The Amoco Oil court noted that a traditional application of
the "likelihood of success on the merits" requirement would require courts to inquire into
the merits of a labor dispute and to encroach on the role'of the arbitrator, a result which is
clearly prohibited by Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge. Id. The court, instead, adopted a modi-
fied standard which required that the plaintiff merely establish that "the position that he
will espouse in arbitrati6n is sufficiently sound to prevent arbitration from being a futile
endeavor." Id. at 704. Accord Lever Bros., 554 F.2d at 120; Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 284-85.
76 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254 (irreparable harm as equitable principle warranting issu-
ance of injunction). See Amoco Oil, 885 F.2d at 704. The irreparable injury requirement
assumes a distinct character in the context of status quo injunctions for breaches of collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Id. In this context, irreparable injury has been construed as
"an injury that would undermine the integrity of the arbitration process by making an
eventual award only an 'empty victory' " because the arbitrator will be unable to award an
adequate remedy. Id. (quoting Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex.
R.R., 363 U.S. 528, 534 (1960)). The clear overlap with the "frustration of arbitration"
analysis "often elevates this assessment of irreparable injury into the central inquiry in sta-
tus quo injunction cases." Id.
Union attempts to enjoin drug testing programs pending arbitration have met with
mixed results, because courts differ as to whether irreparable harm will result in the ab-
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that the balance of hardships favor its issuance.17
It is submitted that if a broad management rights clause is
found to, arguably justify an employer's unilateral implementation
of a drug testing program, implementation should be enjoined
pending the arbitral result of the adjustment board concerning
the rights of the parties under the collective bargaining agree-
ment. It is suggested that injunctive relief is warranted first, to
prevent frustration of the arbitral process, and second, because
the issuance of an injunction is supported-by ordinary principles
of equity.
C. Arbitration
The proliferation of drug testing programs in unionized work-
places has steadily increased the role of arbitration in this area. 78
In some instances, arbitrators have to examine contract provisions
dealing expressly with drug testing to determine whether an em-
ployer has exceeded its authority by implementing an overreach-
sence of injunctive relief. Compare Amoco Oil, 885 F.2d at 707 (in light of privacy invasion
threatened by drug testing program and potential for stigmatization and humiliation, arbi-
tral award of reinstatement and back pay could not make affected employees whole) and
Stove, Furnace & Allied Appliance Workers, Int'l, Local 185 v. Weyerhaeuser Paper Co.,
650 F. Supp. 431, 433 (S.D. I1. 1986) (irreparable harm shown as drug testing could in-
vade privacy and result in "black mark" on employee's work record) with International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Southwest Airlines Co., 875 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir. 1989) (en
banc) (many employment disputes involving discharge implicate reputation of employee,
thus district court finding of irreparable harm to reputation due to disciplinary action
under drug testing program too speculative to support injunction), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
838 (1990) and IBEW v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 634 F. Supp. 642, 644 (D.D.C. 1986)
(injunction denied because drug testing program would cause no injury other than tempo-
rary loss of employment and pay which could be addressed through arbitration).
" See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254. The issue is whether one party will suffer more from
the denial of the injunction than will the other party from its issuance. Id. See, e.g., Amoco
Oil, 885 F.2d at 709. The record contained no evidence of a drug problem in the work-
place, but only of a societal drug problem. Id. The district court found that no injury to
the employer would occur except for a delay in the testing program. Id. On the other
hand, the district court found that the employees would be irreparably injured by imple-
mentation of the drug testing program. Id. The Amoco Oil court held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by finding that the balance of hardships favored issuance of an
injunction. Id.'
78 See Veglahn, What is a Reasonable Drug Testing Program?: Insight from Arbitration Deci-
sions, 39 LAB. L.J., October 1988, at 688 (discusses role of arbitration in the area of drug
testing and enumerates factors that influence arbitration decisions). See generally
Denenberg & Denenberg, Drug Testing From the Arbitrator's Perspective, 11 NOVA L. REV.
371 (1987) (discusses increased role of arbitration in drug testing disputes).
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ing drug testing program. 9 Additionally, arbitrators have to in-
terpret collective bargaining agreements silent as to drug testing,
and decide whether the drug testing program is authorized by an-
other provision of the collective bargaining agreement such as a
management rights clause or an implied agreement between the
parties."0
When management asserts its right to implement "reasonable"
work related rules which govern its employees' conduct while on
duty, and that rule leads to a dispute, an arbitrator considers sev-
eral factors to balance the competing contractual interests of the
employer and the employees."1 Many arbitrators, when determin-
ing the reasonableness of a drug testing program, have considered
the standards of reasonableness that have developed in drug test-
ing cases governed by the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution. 2 Arbitrators have considered these standards not-
" See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1385, 1385-91 (1989) (Baroni, Arb.)
(arbitrator determined whether employer violated collective bargaining agreement by im-
plementing random drug testing program when agreement called only for "just cause"
testing); Roadway Express, Inc., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8467 (1986) (Cooper,
Arb.) (arbitrator determined what constituted "just cause" for drug testing and decided
whether discharge for positive result was proper disciplinary action under agreement).
80 See, e.g., Hopeman Bros., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 373, 385-86 (1986) (Rothschild, Arb.)
(arbitrator determined unilaterally implemented drug testing program in dangerous ship-
yard was authorized by management rights clause of collective bargaining agreement); Ar-
kansas Power & Light Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1065, 1069 (1987) (Weisbrod, Arb.) (arbi-
trator decided rule, promulgated under management rights clause, which required drug
testing of employees in nuclear power facility is reasonable one under collective bargaining
agreement).
" See Dow Chemical, 91 Lab. Arb. at 1388. There were many factors considered by the
arbitrator in balancing the interests of the parties. Id. The arbitrator formed an opinion
after reviewing the nature of the industry, evidence of an existing drug problem, and the
accuracy of the test. Id. However, the arbitrator noted that "predominant weight [is
placed] upon the provisions of the agreement." Id.; Boston Edison, 92 Lab. Arb. at 381.
The arbitrator looked at many factors when balancing competing interests of parties in-
cluding threat to productivity, safety and health, and availability of less intrusive means of
testing. Id.; Marathon Petroleum Co., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 716, 723 (1987) (Grimes, Arb.).
The arbitrator upheld the random drug testing program after considering the nature of
the industry and the work environment. Id. See generally Nolan & Abrams, The Labor Arbi-
trator's Several Roles, 44 MD. L. REV. 873 (1985) (comprehensive view of arbitrator's role in
labor disputes).
82 See, e.g., Dow Chemical, 91 Lab. Arb. at 1388. The arbitrator stated that a balancing
test, similar to that applied to determine reasonableness under the fourth amendment, is
applicable in arbitral disputes. Id.; Arkansas Power, 88 Lab. Arb. at 1072. The arbitrator
cited two cases arising under the fourth amendment for analogy and support for his analy-
sis of reasonableness. Id. The arbitrator noted that the balancing analysis utilized in the
federal cases was not binding upon him, however, he concluded that they were the "most
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withstanding the fact that the fourth amendment does not apply
to situations in which there is an absence of "state action."8 It is
for this reason that an examination of the fourth amendment rea-
sonableness standard, as applied in drug testing cases, is
warranted.
II. REASONABLENESS: BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS
A. Standard of Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution
Employees in the public sector, who have been required to sub-
mit to mandatory drug testing in the workplace, have challenged
the validity of such programs by invoking the fourth amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 4 The
fourth amendment safeguards an individual's legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy against unreasonable governmental invasions.8 5 Al-
applicable authority." Id.
83 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). It is well established that the
constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures applies exclusively to
government action. Id. As far back as 1920, the United States Supreme Court noted that:
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures,
and as shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin
and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of
sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than gov-
ernmental agencies ....
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1920) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has steadfastly maintained the "state action" requirement to pre-
serve "an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judi-
cial power." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982). Limiting federal
court power under the fourth amendment to the proscription of governmental conduct is a
"fundamental fact of our political order." Id. at 937.
" U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. See, e.g., Bangert v. Hodel, 705 F. Supp. 643 (D.D.C. 1989) (Department of Interior
employees challenged drug testing program as infringement of their fourth amendment
rights); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1987) (air
traffic controllers claimed fourth amendment infringement); American Fed'n of Gov't Em-
ployees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (civilian employees of U.S. Army
claimed urinalysis infringed upon fourth amendment rights). See generally 3 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.3(e) at 40 (2d ed. Supp.
1988) (discusses fourth amendment challenges to government implemented drug testing
programs).
" See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979). The Court noted that "[tihe
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though the standard of reasonableness under the fourth amend-
ment is not capable of precise definition, a balancing of the
government's need to conduct a search against the individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy is required.8" Two government
instituted mandatory drug testing programs have produced the
first Supreme Court decisions concerning the reasonableness of
drug testing under the fourth amendment.8"
essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of
reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by government officials . . . in order to
'safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions ...... Id.
(quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978).
The fourth amendment does not preclude all searches and seizures, but only those that
are unreasonable. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). The Supreme Court has noted
that the framers of the Constitution recognized the usefulness of some government
searches; thus they sought to restrain the possible abuses attending such searches, but not
to abolish the power entirely. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 641 (1886) (Miller,
J., concurring). "Hence it is only unreasonable searches and seizures that are forbidden ...
Id. (emphasis in original).
" Bell v. Wolfish; 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
337 (1985) (employs balancing test to determine reasonableness of search); Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (determining reasonableness involves "balancing
the need to search against the invasion which the search entails").
The "cardinal principle" of fourth amendment jurisprudence is that "searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well delineated exceptions." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quot-
ing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted). See Griffin v. Wis-
consin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (except in carefully defined circumstances search is
unreasonable unless accomplished pursuant to judicial warrant issued upon probable
cause).
However, the Supreme Court noted that:
[w]hen the balance of interests precludes insistence on a showing of probable cause,
we [the Supreme Court] have usually required 'some quantum of individualized sus-
picion' before concluding that a search is reasonable . . . We [have] made it clear,
however, that a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, be-
low which a search must be presumed unconstitutional.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct 1402, 1417 (1989) (quoting United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976)). Accord National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1989). The Von Raab Court stated "where a
Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs . . . it is necessary to bal-
ance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine
whether it is impractical [sic] to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion
..... " Id. See also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("special needs" exist
where warrant and probable cause requirements are impracticable).
"7 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422 (toxicological testing of railroad employees who work in
positions effecting public safety found reasonable under fourth amendment); Von Raab, 109
S. Ct. at 1390 (drug testing of United States Custom Service employees directly involved in
drug interdiction or who are required to carry firearm found reasonable under fourth
amendment).
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In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,88 the Court
upheld a Federal Railroad Administration regulation89 which re-
quired all employees involved in railroad accidents to undergo
toxicological testing.90 The Court held that the government's
compelling interest in public safety 'outweighed the individual pri-
vacy concerns of the railroad employee.91 In National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Von Raab,92 the balancing approach was again em-
ployed by the Supreme Court to determine the reasonableness of
an employee drug testing program under the fourth amend-
ment.93 A sharply divided Court upheld a United States Customs
88 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
9 49 C.F.R. § 219.201 (1988). The regulation provides in pertinent part:
[Plost-accident toxicological tests shall be conducted after any event that involves
one or more of the circumstances described in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this
section:
(1) Major train accident. Any train accident that involves one or more of the
following:
(i) A fatality;
(ii) Release of a hazardous material accompanied by-
(A) An evacuation; or
(B) A reportable injury resulting from the hazardous material release . . . ; or
(iii) Damage to railroad property of $500,000 or more.
(2) Impact accident. An impact accident resulting in--
(i) A reportable injury; or
(ii) Damage to railroad property of $50,000 or more.
(3) Fatal train incident. Any train incident that involves a fatality to any on-duty rail-
road employee ....
Id.
80 See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1420.
81 Id. at 1421. In Skinner, the Court had evidence that on-the-job drug use was a substan-
tial safety problem throughout the railroad industry. Id. at 1407. The Court had statistical
data which showed that "at least 21 significant train accidents involving alcohol or drug use
as a probable cause" occurred between the years 1972-83. Id. at 1407-08. See also Which
Drug Tests?, Wash. Post, Mar. 22, 1989, at A18, col. 1. Statistics show that in an 8 year
period, 45 railway accidents involving drug or alcohol impairment by crewmen occurred,
causing 34 fatalities, 66 injuries and $28 million in property damage. Id.
The Court found that the employees subject to the toxicological testing had a diminished
expectation of privacy due to their participation in an "industry that is regulated perva-
sively to insure safety .... " Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1418. The Court also noted that the
regulations attempted to minimize the intrusiveness of the search. Id.
92 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989) (companion case to Skinner).
3 See id. at 1390. The Von Raab majority found that ensuring the fitness, integrity, and
judgment of front-line drug interdiction personnel was essential to national security and
created a special need, which warranted a departure from traditional fourth amendment
requirements. Id. at 1393. Justice Scalia, in a vigorous dissent, argued that there was no
evidence of a drug problem among United States Customs Service employees sufficient to
establish a special need requiring drug testing in the absence of particularized suspicion. Id.
at 1399 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Therefore, Justice Scalia maintained that the majority mis-
applied the special needs rationale and erroneously applied a balancing test. Id. at 1400
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Service drug testing program which required current employees
seeking transfer to certain sensitive positions within the Service to
undergo urinalysis.94 The Court stated that the employees had a
diminished expectation of privacy 95 which was outweighed by the
compelling governmental interest in ensuring that front line drug
interdiction personnel were physically fit and had unimpeachable
integrity and judgment.96 The aforementioned governmental in-
terests were supported by a significant interest in preventing the
promotion of drug users to sensitive positions within the United
States Customs Service. 7
The principal significance of these decisions was the Supreme
Court's approval of testing in the absence of individualized suspi-
cion of employee drug use.98 The Court has avoided an approach
to drug testing cases based on precise bright-line standards; in-
stead it has mandated a case-by-case balancing of individual and
societal interests. 99
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1396. Drug tests were made a condition of placement for drug interdiction posi-
tions because they were viewed as jobs "fraught with obvious dangers to the mission of the
agency and the lives of Customs agents." Id. at 1388. Drug tests were also made a condi-
tion of placement for employees seeking positions which required them to carry a firearm
because "public safety demands that employees who carry deadly arms and are prepared to
make instant life or death decisions be drug free." Id. Finally, drug tests were required of
those employees seeking transfer to positions which required the handling of classified
materials because the materials could fall into the hands of smugglers if employees, "by
reason of their own illegal drug use, are susceptible to bribery or blackmail." Id. The ma-
jority agreed in principle to the testing of employees required to handle classified materi-
als, however, the Court remanded this issue to determine whether the Service had "de-
fined this category of employees more broadly than necessary to meet the purposes of the
commissioner's directives." Id. at 1397.
"' Id. at 1394. The Court stated that customs officers involved in drug interdiction or
who are required to carry firearms "should expect effective inquiry into their fitness and
probity." Id. Moreover, the Court stated that employees "who seek promotion to these
[covered] positions .. .enjoy a diminished expectation of privacy by virtue of the special,
and obvious, physical and ethical demands of those positions." Id. at 1397-98.
Id. at 1395-96. The Court opined that in light of the extraordinary safety and na-
tional security hazards that would attend promotion of drug users to the covered positions,
the Custom Service's policy of deterring drug users from seeking those positions cannot be
deemed unreasonable. Id. at 1395.
National Treasury Employees Union-v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1397 (1989).
'7 See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Von Raab established that particularized suspicion is not always necessary); Brown v. Win-
kle, 715 F. Supp. 195, 197-98 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (upheld suspicionless drug testing of
firefighters based on Von Raab); Hartness v. Bush, 712 F. Supp. 986, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(discussed abandonment of individualized suspicion requirement in Von Raab).
' Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 490 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See Brown, 715 F.
Employee Drug Testing
B. Reasonableness in an Arbitral Context
Many of the concerns voiced by employees in the public sector
have been similarly raised by private sector employees in binding
arbitration. 10 0 Collective bargaining agreements which include ex-
press drug testing clauses have often resulted in arbitrable dis-
putes with employees maintaining that the employer had ex-
ceeded the scope of its authority." 1 In those instances, the role of
the arbitrator is to define the relative rights of the parties under
the collective bargaining agreement.0 2 Similarly, where an em-
ployer utilizes his broad powers under a management rights clause
to unilaterally implement reasonable work related rules and regu-
lations to justify the imposition of drug testing requirements, it is
the arbitrator's task to determine the "reasonableness" of those
requirements.0 In some instances, arbitrators have employed a
balancing test substantially similar to that used in ascertaining rea-
sonableness within the meaning of the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution.104 Although in many instances arbitra-
tors have required some level of individualized suspicion to war-
rant drug screening, 10 5 it is submitted that in situations where
Supp. at 196 (question of reasonableness dealt with on case-by-case basis). See, e.g., Hartness,
712 F. Supp. at 993 (court distinguished groups of employees upholding testing of employ-
ees required to carry firearms while enjoining testing of other employees).
100 See, e.g., Boston Edison Co., 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 374, 381 (1988) (Nicolau, Arb.)
(union argued lack of drug problem and flaws in testing made drug testing program unrea-
sonable); Arkansas Power & Light Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1065, 1071 (1987) (Weisbrod,
Arb.) (union attempted to establish drug testing as unreasonable due to inaccuracy);
Hopeman Bros., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 373, 377 (1986) (Rothschild, Arb.) (union contended
that drug testing program implemented by company ignored rights and protection given
employees under U.S. Constitution).
01 See supra note 79 and accompanying text (cases in which mandatory drug testing pro-
grams were implemented based upon existing drug testing clause).
o2 See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1385, 1387 (1989) (Baroni, Arb.)
(arbitrator must decide how reasonableness of "for cause" drug testing program is affected
by suspicionless drug testing); Roadway Express, Inc., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) V
8467 (1986) (Cooper, Arb.) (arbitrator determined whether "probable cause" drug testing
program in agreement reasonably allowed for mandatory, suspicionless drug testing).
'"5 See, e.g., Arkansas Power, 88 Lab. Arb. at 1068 (arbitrator determined whether drug
testing program was "reasonable" within meaning of contract provision which allowed em-
ployer to promulgate reasonable rules and discipline employees); Hopeman Bros., 88 Lab.
Arb. at 382 (arbitrator agreed employer could formulate own rules and regulations, if
reasonable).
'" See supra note 82 and accompanying text (arbitrators applying fourth amendment
standard).
105 See, e.g., Boston Edison Co., 92' Lab. Arb. (BNA) 374, 382 (1988) (Nicolau, Arb.)
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safety or other compelling interests are involved, arbitrators will,
in light of Skinner and Von Raab, be inclined to uphold the reason-
ableness of a disputed program in the absence of any level of
suspicion.
C. Collective Bargaining, Arbitration and Public Policy
While arbitrators operate within the realm of the parties' collec-
tive bargaining agreement, and to that extent are beholden to pri-
vate interests, it has been asserted that arbitrators also fulfill a
public function." 6 When the arbitrator has cause to look at the
reasonableness of a drug testing program, the arbitrator's ap-
praisal may be influenced by a. number of different factors includ-
ing the judgment of other arbitrators," 7 court rulings,'08 and
public policy.'09 The conscientious arbitrator may look to society
in general to identify fundamental values shared by the parties in-
volved in a dispute.' One such value which is basic to a civilized
("without cause" drug testing program found unreasonable); Maple Meadow Mining, 90
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 873, 880 (1988) (Phelan, Arb.) (random testing impermissible as no rea-
sonable cause for testing exists).
'" See Nolan & Abrams, The Labor Arbitrator's Several Roles, 44 MD. L. REV. 873, 881-84
(1985). The authors note that an arbitrator's personal values inevitably affect his decisions
in the arbitration. Id. at 882. "Even if the arbitrator views his task as purely interpretive,
there is no way interpretation can be done mechanically; at some point, human judgment
comes into play." Id.
1 7 See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 685, 689 (1988) (Talarico,
Arb.) (looked to other arbitrators' decisions to decide issue which involved discipline of
employees by management); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 841, 843
(1988) (Katz, Arb.) (arbitrator adopted ruling of earlier arbitration decision); Ashland Pe-
troleum Co., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 681, 686 (1988) (Volz, Arb.) (quoted from previous arbi-
tration decisions involving issue of drug testing).
10 See, e.g., City of Edina, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 209, 211 (1987) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.) (arbi-
trator noted she was not bound by judicial decisions but agreed with "vast majority of
arbitrators" that Supreme Court decision on point provided guidance on issue being de-
cided); Arkansas Power & Light Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1065, 1072 (1987) (Weisbrod,
Arb.) (although not bound by fourth amendment case on point, arbitrator found it most
applicable authority due to factual similarities and, consequently, applied its standards).
10 Methodist Hosp., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 969, 976 (1988) (Reynolds, Arb.) (arbitrator
allowed smoking ban in hospital after noting effects of environmental smoke); Arkansas
Power, 88 Lab. Arb. at 1072 (public interest in avoiding nuclear holocaust outweighs any
rights employees have to use recreational drugs during off hours).
1 0 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 106, at 882. "No one is immune from outside influ-
ences and thus to some degree, the arbitrator's values will reflect the communities' values.
... [T]he arbitrator's judgment is influenced by the values ... of the parties to the dispute;
others in the industry; . . . the community of arbitrators; the broader society, and so on."
Id.; Abrams, The Nature of the Arbitral Process: Substantive Decision-Making in Labor Arbitra-
Employee Drug Testing
society is the right to privacy." 1 It is submitted that an employee's
expectation of privacy should be treated similarly whether the in-
dividual works in the public or private sector.
Generally, individuals do not relinquish their fourth amend-
ment rights merely by entering into an employment relationship
in the public sector."' An analogous concept has been applied to
disputes arising in the private sector, where it has been observed
that "an employee does not somehow abandon his right to privacy
at the doorstep of the employer's premises.""'  It has been estab-
lished, however, that the right of privacy, when weighed against
the safety of the public or some other compelling interest, may
yield to the operational realities of the particular circumstances.""
CONCLUSION
The validity of drug testing in the workplace has been exten-
tion, 14 U. CAL. DAvis L. REV. 551, 564 (1981). The arbitrator looks beyond the agreement
to resolve conflicts and applies "established norms of construction." Id. See also Gross,
Value Judgments in the Decisions of Labor Arbitrators, 21 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 55 (1967)
(discusses influence of arbitrators' values on their decisions).
... See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
11 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987). The Court noted that "[a]s with
the expectation of privacy in one's home, such an expectation in one's place of work is
'based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the [fourth] amend-
ment.' " Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n.8 (1984)).
"' Trailways, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1073, 1080 (1987) (Goodman, Arb.). The arbi-
trator reasoned that:
[An individual, by signing on to an employment relationship, does not generally
expect his or her private life to be scrutinized by the employer, nor does the exis-
tence of an employment relationship automatically entitle an employer to reach be-
yond the workplace and dictate, by discipline, the private lifestyles, morals, and be-
havior of its employees.
Id. See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 898 (3d Cir. 1983). The Novosel
court rejected as obsolete, the assertion that "there occurs an express or implied waiver or
relinquishment of otherwise valid constitutional rights when an employee voluntarily en-
gages in employment .... Id. (quoting Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 82-1600, slip
op. at 1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 1983)).
.. See, e.g., Arkansas Power & Light Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1065, 1070 (1987) (Weis-
brod, Arb.) (requiring all employees with access to protected areas of nuclear power plant
to submit to drug testing found reasonable in light of overwhelming safety interests);
Hopeman Bros., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 373, 380 (1986) (Rothschild, Arb.) (safety needs in
extremely hazardous shipyard outweighed employee's right to privacy). Cf. Rushton v. Ne-
braska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1988) (publicly owned power com-
pany's drug testing program of nuclear power plant employees found reasonable in light of
safety concerns). But see Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001, 1008 (1987)
(Heinsz, Arb.) (unilaterally implemented random, suspicionless drug testing program found
unreasonable notwithstanding safety factors involved in manufacturing explosives).
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sively debated over the past several years. Since it is clear that
drug testing will remain an issue in the public and private sectors,
employers and employees should be prepared to discuss and nego-
tiate the terms and scope of a drug testing program and its attend-
ant consequences. Employers must recognize that drug testing can
be a significant invasion into the privacy and dignity of the indi-
vidual and should therefore seek to minimize its intrusiveness. On
the other hand, employees must recognize that drug testing is an
effective tool in maintaining the efficiency and safety of the work
environment.
Recent developments indicate a trend toward a more uniform
standard of reasonableness. It is understandable that this uniform-
ity should begin to manifest itself when it is recognized that the
expectation of privacy an individual possesses in the dissemination
of his or her bodily fluids remains the same whether the individ-
ual is employed in the public or the private sector. A careful bal-
ancing of these privacy interests with the employers' legitimate in-
terests in conducting drug testing should accommodate the
interests of the employee, the employer, and the public.
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